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Abstract
When does self-interest influence public opinion on contentious public policies? The
bulk of theory in political science suggests that self-interest is only a minor force in
public opinion. Using nationally-representative survey data, we show how financial
and spatial self-interest and partisanship all shape public opinion on opioid treatment
policy. We find that a majority of respondents support a redistributive funding model
for treatment programs, while treatment funded by taxation based on a community’s
overdose rate is less popular. Moreover, financial self-interest cross-pressures lower-
income Republicans, closing the partisan gap in support by more than half. We also
experimentally test how the spatial burden of siting treatment clinics alters policy
preferences. People across the political spectrum are less supportive when construction
of a clinic is proposed closer to their home. These results highlight how partisanship
and self-interest interact in shaping preferences on public policy with concentrated
burdens.
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When does self-interest motivate people’s opinions on public policy? Much of political
science has downplayed the role of self-interest in the formation of public opinion (Kinder and
Kiewiet, 1981; Sears and Funk, 1991). Especially when it comes to economic self-interest,
people often form opinions counter to what political scientists assume would be their rational,
self-interested preferences (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Gelman, 2008). Instead, researchers
note the primacy of partisanship and ideology in public opinion (e.g. Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler, 2002).
The deepening opioid overdose crisis presents a policy challenge in which self-interest
may be especially strong. Each day, nearly 200 Americans die from a drug overdose, making
overdose the leading cause of death for Americans under age 55 (Katz and Sanger-Katz,
2018). Despite the acuity of this crisis, policymakers have faced difficulty in appropriating
and allocating the funding public health experts believe is necessary to combat the epidemic
(Saloner and Barry, 2018).
Part of this shortfall may stem from variation in need for these policies. Currently,
many high-need communities bear a disproportionate share of the financial burden in re-
sponding to the crisis.1 Municipal and county governments often must cover the increased
costs of emergency call volumes, ambulance services, medical examiner and coroner bills,
overcrowded jails, and care services for those struggling with addiction (Seligson and Reid,
2017). Moreover, people often fear that the construction of addiction treatment infrastruc-
ture will deteriorate public safety, decrease property values, and diminish overall quality of
life (e.g. Banker, 2017). Through these intense forces of financial and spatial self-interest, the
opioid crisis provides an opportunity to test when self-interest motivates policy preferences.
Furthermore, the crisis affects not only urban areas, but also rural, whiter, less wealthy, and
more conservative parts of the United States in a way that previous drug crises have not
(Jalal et al., 2018). This political geography provides new ground for understanding theories
1Ohio, for instance, has large within-state inequality of costs in confronting the opioid crisis. Rembert et al.
(2017) estimate that in 2015 multiple Ohio counties bore costs greater than $1,400 per capita, while in five
low-overdose counties costs were less than $100 per capita.
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of self-interest across political, demographic, and geographic spectrums where these forces
may cross-pressure members of the public.
Using a nationally-representative survey and an embedded experiment, we test support
for policies to address the opioid crisis, specifically the funding of treatment and the construc-
tion of new treatment clinics. In our experiment, we vary the location of a proposed clinic
to test the influence of a respondents’ spatial self-interest on public opinion. Overall, we find
that treatment policy funded redistributively is more popular than policy funded based on a
community’s local overdose burden, as current financial burdens are de facto allocated. Un-
der both funding models, people support policies less if they will pay more to fund the policy,
demonstrating the influence of financial self-interest. Leveraging the geographic breadth of
our survey sample, we also test how self-interest and partisan predispositions cross-pressure
voters. While Republicans are less supportive of treatment policies than Democrats overall,
financial self-interest cross-pressures lower-income Republicans, leading them to form opin-
ions more in line with partisans across the aisle than they would otherwise. Additionally, we
show that the physical proximity of treatment infrastructure activates spatial self-interest:
people across the political spectrum oppose clinic construction more when it is proposed
closer to their home. Together, these results demonstrate the power of self-interest and its
ability to cross-pressure voters on an especially severe policy challenge with concentrated
burdens.
Theoretical Expectations
Research on “policy feedback” has shown that direct policy benefits from social programs —
such as Medicare and the GI bill — may galvanize constituencies to protect those policies
(e.g., Campbell, 2005; Mettler, 2005). Similarly, direct policy costs may provoke opposition
due to financial self-interest, such as wealthy homeowners opposing high property taxes
(Sears and Citrin, 1982). Such costs may be not only financial, but also spatial, provoking
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self-interest typified by NIMBY (‘Not In My Backyard’) opposition (e.g., Hankinson, 2018;
Stokes, 2016). Public policy to confront the opioid crisis may activate an especially powerful
sense of self-interest because of the policies’ concentrated burdens. Specifically, self-interest
may motivate people to support policies in which they will pay less relative to policies where
they will pay more, and support treatment infrastructure less when it is closer to them rather
than far.
However, partisan polarization may limit the influence of self-interest. Preferences for
drug treatment policy — as with many other policies — have historically cleaved along par-
tisan lines: Democrats have ordinarily been more supportive of treatment programs than
Republicans (Meier, 1994). At national, state, and local levels, evidence abounds that parti-
sanship shapes policy outputs (Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu, 2017; de Benedictis-Kessner and
Warshaw, 2016). Growing polarization among elites and the nationalization of politics may
reinforce the degree to which this partisanship affects public opinion (Druckman, Peterson,
and Slothuus, 2013; Hopkins, 2018). Yet in some policy areas, partisan polarization has led
to few policy differences (Anzia and Moe, 2017; Grumbach, 2018). Especially in the area of
health policy, personal experiences and self-interest may attenuate the role of partisanship
(Campbell, 2015; Lerman and McCabe, 2017).
Because of the geography of the opioid crisis, the communities most affected by today’s
crisis — those who are also currently paying the cost of treatment policy — are much more
likely to be conservative than in past drug crises. Therefore the voters whose self-interest
— based on their income, context, and location — might influence their policy preferences
may also have differing partisan predispositions towards health policy. In other words, voters
may be cross-pressured (Klar, 2013; Chong, Citrin, and Conley, 2001) by their partisanship
and self-interest in the formation of policy preferences concerning the opioid crisis. We
expect that financial and spatial self-interest may influence individuals to form opinions that
decrease attitudinal polarization between parties.
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Research Design and Data
To test these theoretical questions, we surveyed a representative sample of 2,000 United
States residents in 2018.2 In this survey, we asked respondents their support for a pol-
icy funding opioid treatment and a policy that would open a new treatment clinic nearby.
We measured support for each using a five-point scale from ‘strongly support’ to ‘strongly
oppose.’3
The first policy proposal involved a $100 million state bill funding medication-assisted
opioid addiction treatment. Using a split-sample design, we described a funding model
designed in one of two ways that varied the allocation of the policy’s financial burden.4 In
the first of the two split-sample options, the income-based option, we describe the policy as
funded redistributively, with those people who have a household income higher than their
state’s median income paying more than those with a lower household income. In the second
split-sample option, the overdose rate-based option, we describe the policy as funded instead
according to a community’s overdose rate, with those living in areas with a higher opioid
overdose rate relative to their state’s median rate paying more than those in areas with a lower
overdose rate.5 This second option — allocating financial burden based on the local overdose
burden — matches the costs of treatment to those who would benefit from the funding, a
framework championed for other policies with spatially concentrated benefits (e.g., Mullin,
Smith, and McNamara, 2018). Furthermore, this design of policy matches the status quo, in
which cities and counties with high rates of opioid use have few outside resources to which
2In Appendix A, we further describe the sampling procedure and demographic characteristics of this survey,
conducted on the NORC AmeriSpeak panel.
3We recoded each of the scales to a binary measure with the value 1 if respondents answered either ‘strongly
support’ or ‘somewhat support’ and 0 otherwise. Appendix F shows the text of all survey questions.
4In both cases, the funding of the policy was allocated such that some people would pay $55 while oth-
ers would pay $5 in additional taxes for the policy. These dollar figures were based on the 2018 federal
budget, wherein the federal government proposed spending $4.6 billion to fight the opioid crisis (Mulvi-
hill, 2018). Were all $4.6 billion to be directed to treatment funding, the average payment per taxpayer
would be approximately $30. We divide the $30 per person into a 1:11 ratio to emphasize the potentially
disproportionate burden sharing.
5As described in full detail in Appendix F, we use information about respondents (their income and location)
to display which of the funding groups they would be in for that policy.
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they can turn and must shoulder the financial burden for these policies.6 In short, our first
policy option allocates costs redistributively while the second option mirrors the status quo,
allocating financial costs according to need.
The second policy proposal involved the construction of a new opioid treatment clinic.
We experimentally varied the clinic’s proposed location to manipulate its spatial cost and
therefore assess the causal effect of respondents’ spatial self-interest. We described the pro-
posed location as either 2 miles away (a 40-minute walk), in the far treatment condition,
or 1/4 mile away (a 5-minute walk), in the near treatment condition, from the respon-
dent’s home. The difference in average levels of support for the treatment clinic between
the two experimental conditions represents the treatment effect of the proximity of policy
infrastructure.
To assess moderators of self-interest, we measured respondent exposure to the opioid
crisis, as contact with societal ills may affect political participation and policy attitudes
(e.g., Bateson, 2012). First, we asked if respondents personally knew anyone who had been
addicted to opioids, including heroin and prescription pain killers. Second, we measured
respondents’ contextual exposure to overdose deaths by connecting their ZIP code to county-
level data on opioid death rates in 2015 from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS)
provided by the Centers for Disease Control’s National Center for Health Statistics. Finally,
we recorded respondents’ self-reported partisan identification, ideology, income, and ZIP
code.
Results
We first assess how respondents’ characteristics determine support for opioid treatment pol-
icy, separating the two split-sample funding-allocation options for the first policy proposal
and aggregating both experimental treatment groups for our second policy proposal. These
6For instance, taxpayers in these communities are increasingly forced to raise property taxes to fund their
own treatment programs (e.g., Boyle, 2017).
5
descriptive results are presented in the three panels of Figure 1, with the percent of respon-
dents supporting each policy on the vertical axis and subgroups by respondents’ characteris-
tics along the horizontal axis. Overall, 56% supported the redistributive treatment funding
proposal, while 44% supported the needs-based funding proposal and 46% supported the
construction of a new opioid treatment clinic in their community. This preference for the
redistributive over the needs-based funding model for treatment funding extends across all
subgroups of respondents.
As with most social policies, partisanship and ideology divide public opinion on all three
opioid treatment policy options. Republican respondents were 28 percentage points less likely
to support the policy proposal with a redistributive funding model for addiction treatment,
15 percentage points less likely to support the needs-based proposal, and 25 percentage points
less likely to support the construction of a treatment clinic than Democratic respondents.7
Personal exposure to the opioid crisis also affected people’s support for these policies.
54% of our sample reported personally knowing someone who had struggled with opioid
addiction. Respondents who reported knowing someone who has been addicted to opioids
were on average 9 percentage points more supportive of each of the three policies than those
who did not know someone with addiction issues.8 Income and community exposure to the
opioid crisis also influence policy preferences, which we explore in detail in the next section.
7In Appendix C, we present these results in tabular form along with additional subgroups of respondents.
8We explore the correlates of knowing someone with addiction in Appendix A, as well as differential support
across other moderators in Appendix C.
6
Treatment Funding: Redistributive
All
Respondents
(n = 991)
Democrats
(n = 499)
Independents
(n = 174)
Republicans
(n = 317)
Below Median
Income
(n = 507)
Above Median
Income
(n = 484)
Below Median
Overdose Rate
(n = 533)
Above Median
Overdose Rate
(n = 458)
Don't Know
Someone
w/ Addiction
(n = 444)
Know
Someone
w/ Addiction
(n = 547)
20
40
60
80
Subgroup
%
 S
up
po
rt 
Po
lic
y
Treatment Funding: Needs-Based
All
Respondents
(n = 1012)
Democrats
(n = 488)
Independents
(n = 163)
Republicans
(n = 359)
Below Median
Income
(n = 475)
Above Median
Income
(n = 537)
Below Median
Overdose Rate
(n = 536)
Above Median
Overdose Rate
(n = 476)
Don't Know
Someone
w/ Addiction
(n = 484)
Know
Someone
w/ Addiction
(n = 528)
20
40
60
80
Subgroup
%
 S
up
po
rt 
Po
lic
y
Clinic Construction
All
Respondents
(n = 2000)
Democrats
(n = 987)
Independents
(n = 337)
Republicans
(n = 673)
Below Median
Income
(n = 982)
Above Median
Income
(n = 1018)
Below Median
Overdose Rate
(n = 1067)
Above Median
Overdose Rate
(n = 933)
Don't Know
Someone
w/ Addiction
(n = 926)
Know
Someone
w/ Addiction
(n = 1074)
20
40
60
80
Subgroup
%
 S
up
po
rt 
Po
lic
y
Figure 1: Policy support with 95% confidence intervals among respondent subgroups.
Financial Self-Interest
We next assess the role of self-interest in support for our first policy proposal, the state bill
funding opioid treatment. In both funding models, we operationalize financial self-interest
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as the difference in support between those who would pay more and those who would pay
less. For those who viewed the proposal funded redistributively, this means the difference in
support between above-median income respondents, who would pay $55, and below-median
income respondents, who would pay $5. In the overdose rate-based funding model, we
operationalize self-interest as the difference in support between those who live in areas with
higher rates of overdose and those in areas with lower rates of overdose.
To capture the relative importance of self-interest, we measured the difference in support
for each funding condition across the dimension determining self-interest and present these
results in Figure 2, with raw differences plotted as circles and covariate-adjusted model coef-
ficients as triangles.9 For the redistributive funding model, on the left, higher income respon-
dents were 9 percentage points less supportive of the policy than lower-income respondents.
Similar results hold for the needs-based funding model, shown on the right. Respondents
living in high-overdose areas were 8 percentage points less in favor of needs-based treatment
funding than those in low overdose areas.10
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Figure 2: Effect of self-interest on policy support across both funding models with 95% (thin
lines) and 90% (thick lines) confidence intervals.
9Covariate-adjusted models include age, gender, race, homeownership, marital status, education, partisan-
ship, ideology, and indicators for above median income and above median overdose rate.
10We present tabular results in Appendix D.
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To put these effects in context, we compare these differences between groups with oppos-
ing self-interest to the polarization between partisan groups. In Figure 3, we plot the effect of
an indicator for whether or not the respondent was a Republican (rather than a Democrat)
for both funding models, with raw differences again plotted as circles and covariate-adjusted
model coefficients as triangles. For the redistributive funding model, Republicans were 28
percentage points less supportive of the redistributively-funded policy than Democrats, and
15 percentage points less supportive of the overdose rate-based funding model. These sharp
partisan divides show the power of partisanship in policy preferences. In comparison, the
effect of partisanship is roughly double that of self-interest on support for these policy pro-
posals.
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Figure 3: Effect of partisanship on policy support across both funding models with 95%
(thin lines) and 90% (thick lines) confidence intervals.
We next assess cross-pressuring within each party by interacting the relevant self-interest
variable with an indicator for party identification. We plot these differential effects in Fig-
ure 4, for the redistributive funding model in the left panel and the overdose rate-based
funding model in the right panel. For the redistributive funding model, self-interest — as
measured by income group — has an effect close to zero among Democrats, whereas it has
a 19 percentage point effect among Republicans. This interaction of 21 percentage points
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between self-interest and partisanship is statistically significant (p < 0.01), demonstrating
that Republicans were cross-pressured when faced with a redistributive policy proposal. This
effect manifests as a boost in support among low-income Republicans and a decrease in the
partisan gap in support by more than half, as we show in Appendix Figure A2. In contrast,
for the overdose rate-based model, self-interest — as measured by local overdose rates —
had a similar effect among both Democrats and Republicans.
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Figure 4: Effect of self-interest on policy support by partisanship across both funding models
with 95% (thin lines) and 90% (thick lines) confidence intervals.
Spatial Self-Interest and the Implementation of Infrastructure
Next, we test the causal effect of spatial self-interest by experimentally varying the proximity
of a proposed treatment clinic. We operationalize the effect of self-interest as the difference in
support between those respondents in the “near” condition, who evaluated a clinic proposed
1/4 mile away, and those in the “far” condition, who evaluated a clinic proposed 2 miles
away. We plot this treatment effect in Figure 5 for the full sample, on the left, and partisan
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subgroups, on the right.
Among our full sample, 53% who were in the far condition supported the new treatment
clinic, whereas respondents who were in the near condition were 14 percentage points less
supportive of clinic construction (p < 0.01). This treatment effect demonstrates how the
proximity of infrastructure and corresponding spatial self-interest shapes opinion on imple-
menting opioid treatment policy.
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Figure 5: Effect of spatial self-interest on policy support by partisanship with 95% (thin
lines) and 90% (thick lines) confidence intervals.
To put this effect in context, we can compare the influence of spatial self-interest to that
of partisanship for this policy proposal. As discussed earlier, Republicans were 25 percentage
points less supportive of clinic construction than Democrats. While the magnitude of self-
interest’s influence is less than that of partisanship, it is still substantial.
To test whether spatial self-interest cross-pressures partisans as it did for financial self-
interest, we separately estimate this treatment effect by respondents’ partisanship and test
for an interaction between spatial self-interest and partisanship. As shown on the right side
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of Figure 5, the effect of spatial self-interest among Republicans and Democrats is largely
similar, whether or not covariates are used in the models. This stability demonstrates the
enduring power of spatial self-interest across partisan subgroups.11
Conclusion
The eventual success (or failure) of government response to the opioid crisis relies at least in
part on public opinion. Generating a body of knowledge about which features of policy —
both in funding and implementation — are more widely supported is crucial to navigating
the policy process on this issue. Moreover, the opioid crisis provides a novel opportunity
to assess how self-interest interacts with other political considerations when people form
opinions on high-stakes policies.
Using a nationally-representative survey, we find considerable support for opioid treat-
ment policies. However, the specifics of policy design substantially alter their palatability.
Our split-sample survey demonstrates that people consistently favor treatment policy funded
redistributively — allocating the financial burden according to individuals’ income and not
local overdose rates, as burdens are currently distributed. We also show that while ideo-
logical preferences shape the degree to which people favor redistributive funding, financial
self-interest can cross-pressure voters, especially Republicans. Still, such cross-pressuring is
not universal, as we show the strength and durability of spatial self-interest in our experiment
on siting treatment clinics.
Our results present two direct implications for the policy response to the opioid cri-
sis. First, the popularity of policy funded redistributively suggests that policymakers have
wide leeway for structuring opioid treatment legislation progressively. While this type of
policy is favored by broad swaths of the population, policymakers should be aware of how
financial burdens may influence this support. The cross-pressuring of partisans towards re-
11We present these results in Table A9 in Appendix E, where we also assess heterogeneity in our treatment
effect by income and respondents’ personal or community exposure to the opioid crisis.
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distributive funding suggests that policymakers may leverage self-interest specifically among
lower-income conservative voters to build broad coalitions of policy support. Second, spatial
self-interest consistently provokes NIMBY opposition towards new treatment clinics. Histor-
ically, such opposition has led policymakers to concentrate unwanted policy infrastructure in
low-income and minority neighborhoods where political mobilization is less likely (Bullard,
2008). Our results warn of the potential for similar stark inequalities in the spatial distribu-
tion of the infrastructure needed to address the opioid crisis.
More generally, our results add to the knowledge of how self-interest structures attitudes.
On this policy issue, as on others, the allocation of a policy’s shared burdens — financially
and spatially — may drive self-interest and therefore public support. As with policy solutions
to other collective challenges — such as climate change (Bechtel and Scheve, 2013; Stokes
and Warshaw, 2017) — when policies target benefits or concentrate costs based on a group’s
income, location, or reliance on the policy, self-interest matters for these policies’ public
support. Further research is needed to understand whether this self-interest will obstruct
policy efforts to confront the opioid crisis and halt the growing number of fatalities.
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Supplementary Appendix for
“Concentrated Burdens:
How Self-Interest and Partisanship Shape Opinion on
Opioid Treatment Policy”
A Survey Sample Characteristics
Our survey sample was collected by the nonpartisan research organization NORC at the
University of Chicago. NORC recruits a probability-based survey panel called AmeriSpeak
that is designed to be representative of the US household population. NORC’s AmeriSpeak
panelists participate in studies on behalf of academic and government research as well as
for-profit marketing research.
Our survey was conducted on the web only using a general population of US adults age
18 and over between August 2 and September 6, 2018. During this study period, NORC
sent 7 email reminders and 2 SMS reminders to non-respondents between August 4 and
September 5. Panelists were offered the cash equivalent of $1 for completing the study, and
those respondents who completed the survey took a median of 1 minute to complete it. The
weighted cumulative AAPOR RR3 response rate was 8.5%.
In Table A1 below, we show the demographic characteristics of the sample that eventually
completed our survey.
Table A1: Descriptive Characteristics of AmeriSpeak Survey Sample
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Age 48.399 16.735 18 34 62 90
% Above Median Overdose Rate 0.466 0.499 0 0 1 1
% Above State Median Income 0.511 0.500 0 0 1 1
% Female 0.536 0.499 0 0 1 1
% Democrat 0.494 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
% Liberal 0.348 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
% College Degree 0.494 0.500 0 0 1 1
% Married 0.505 0.500 0 0 1 1
% White 0.663 0.473 0 0 1 1
% Black 0.112 0.315 0 0 0 1
% Hispanic 0.151 0.359 0 0 0 1
% Homeowner 0.678 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
% Know Someone with Addiction 0.536 0.499 0 0 1 1
In order to further assess who is most affected by the opioid crisis, we also analyzed the
predictors of someone answering the question on survey about whether they knew someone
struggling with addiction. First, in Figure A1 we show the number of people answering
reporting each response option for this question. Second, in Table A2 we show the results of
a regression predicting a positive response to any of these categories of personal exposure on
demographic characteristics. People who are personally in contact with someone struggling
with addiction are more likely to be younger, less likely to be black, less likely to be a home-
owner, more likely to be a political independent or Republican, less likely to be conservative,
less educated, and more likely to be in the Northeast or the West.
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Figure A1: Personal exposure to the opioid crisis
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Table A2: Predictors of Personal Exposure to Opioid Addiction
Dependent variable:
Know Someone w/ Addiction
Age −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Female −0.012
(0.024)
Black −0.075∗
(0.042)
Hispanic −0.033
(0.036)
Homeowner −0.051∗
(0.029)
Party: Independent 0.097∗∗
(0.041)
Party: Republican 0.117∗∗∗
(0.036)
Ideology: Moderate −0.051
(0.033)
Ideology: Conservative −0.082∗∗
(0.039)
College Degree −0.068∗∗∗
(0.025)
Married −0.030
(0.026)
Income >50k −0.038
(0.027)
Region: Northeast 0.105∗∗∗
(0.039)
Region: South 0.046
(0.031)
Region: West 0.078∗∗
(0.034)
Constant 0.701∗∗∗
(0.052)
Observations 1,749
Adjusted R2 0.025
F Statistic 3.945∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Omitted category for partisanship is ’Democrat’,
for ideology is ’Liberal’, and for Region is
’Midwest’
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B Demographic Balance Across Experimental Condi-
tions
In this section, we assess demographic balance across the two experimental conditions in
our experiment. The only observable demographic characteristic on which we observe a
statistically distinguishable imbalance is age, though the substantive size of this difference
is quite small, as shown in Table A3. However, to ensure that this slight imbalance does
not affect our estimated experimental treatment effects, we include models with covariates
in our main analyses alongside the raw treatment effects.
Table A3: Experimental Balance on Covariates
Mean[Near condition] Mean[Far condition] p-value of difference
Age 47.61 49.15 0.04
% Above Median Overdose Rate 0.46 0.47 0.55
% Above State Median Income 0.49 0.53 0.16
% Female 0.53 0.54 0.46
% Democrat 0.49 0.50 0.83
% Republican 0.33 0.35 0.29
% Liberal 0.31 0.31 0.82
% Conservative 0.32 0.31 0.86
% Income >50k 0.55 0.57 0.31
% College Degree 0.48 0.50 0.39
% Married 0.51 0.50 0.92
% White 0.66 0.66 0.90
% Black 0.11 0.11 0.80
% Hispanic 0.15 0.15 0.81
% Homeowner 0.65 0.67 0.42
% Know Someone w/ Addiction 0.54 0.53 0.61
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C Descriptive Results in Tabular Form
In this section, we first present our treatment policy funding results in tabular form, dis-
playing the mean support for the two split-sample treatment funding options, income-based
redistributive funding and overdose rate-based funding, as well as for the clinic construction
proposal across various subgroups, as presented in Figure 1 in the main text. Within each
subgroup, we find no evidence of floor or ceiling effects that might bias our main results.
Table A4: Policy Support Among Demographic Subgroups
Redistributive Overdose rate-based Clinic Construction
Subgroup Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n
All Respondents 0.558 (0.497) 991 0.442 (0.497) 1012 0.457 (0.498) 2000
Democrats 0.693 (0.462) 499 0.508 (0.5) 488 0.562 (0.496) 987
Independents 0.425 (0.496) 174 0.423 (0.496) 163 0.427 (0.495) 337
Republicans 0.416 (0.494) 317 0.359 (0.48) 359 0.316 (0.465) 673
Liberals 0.755 (0.431) 314 0.578 (0.495) 308 0.602 (0.49) 621
Moderates 0.500 (0.501) 268 0.414 (0.493) 273 0.460 (0.499) 541
Conservatives 0.447 (0.498) 284 0.385 (0.487) 343 0.320 (0.467) 625
Below Median Income 0.600 (0.49) 507 0.385 (0.487) 475 0.491 (0.5) 982
Above Median Income 0.514 (0.5) 484 0.492 (0.5) 537 0.424 (0.494) 1018
Below Median Overdose Rate 0.553 (0.498) 533 0.481 (0.5) 536 0.454 (0.498) 1067
Above Median Overdose Rate 0.563 (0.497) 458 0.397 (0.49) 476 0.461 (0.499) 933
Know Someone w/ Addiction 0.598 (0.491) 547 0.479 (0.5) 528 0.501 (0.5) 1074
Don’t Know Someone w/ Addiction 0.509 (0.5) 444 0.401 (0.491) 484 0.406 (0.491) 926
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D Treatment Funding Results in Tabular Form
In this section, we present our main effects of financial self-interest (Table A5) both as differ-
ences in means and when modeled with demographic covariates, as presented graphically in
Figure 2. Across each specification, the covariate-adjusted effect of self-interest differs only
in magnitude from the difference-in-means tests.
Finally, we test for heterogeneous effects of financial self-interest among different respon-
dent groups for each of the two policy funding options by interacting the measure of financial
self-interest with demographic covariates. We present these results in Table A6, with the
redistributive funding model in columns 1-4 and the overdose rate-based funding model in
columns 5-8. These results are shown graphically in Figure A2 as well, with support for
the redistributive funding model in the left panel and for the overdose rate-based funding
model in the right panel. This demonstrates that the effect of self-interest on support for
the redistributive funding model for Republicans manifests as a boost in support among
low-income individuals that closes the distance between partisans by more than half.
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Table A5: Financial Self-Interest Effects
Support for:
Redistributive Policy Needs-based Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Above State Median Income −0.085∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
Above Median Overdose Rate −0.011 −0.084∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
Age 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.034 −0.084∗∗
(0.032) (0.033)
Black −0.121∗∗ −0.102∗
(0.056) (0.058)
Hispanic −0.081∗ −0.040
(0.046) (0.050)
Homeowner −0.089∗∗ −0.038
(0.039) (0.040)
Independent −0.253∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.085∗
(0.055) (0.042) (0.057) (0.045)
Republican −0.201∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.034) (0.050) (0.034)
Moderate −0.151∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046)
Conservative −0.145∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗
(0.053) (0.055)
College Degree 0.071∗∗ −0.001
(0.034) (0.034)
Married −0.017 −0.002
(0.035) (0.036)
Constant 0.600∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.067) (0.021) (0.021) (0.068) (0.022)
Observations 991 842 990 1,012 902 1,010
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.121 0.074 0.006 0.048 0.017
F Statistic 7.317∗∗∗ 9.879∗∗∗ 40.605∗∗∗ 7.301∗∗∗ 4.499∗∗∗ 9.577∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Omitted category for partisanship is ’Democrat’
and for ideology is ’Liberal’
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Table A6: Financial Self-Interest Effect: Heterogeneity by Respondent Characteristics
Support for:
Redistributive Policy Needs-based Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above Median Income 0.019 −0.035 0.083
(0.042) (0.065) (0.053)
Party = Independent −0.175∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗ −0.079 0.013
(0.053) (0.070) (0.061) (0.072)
Party = Republican −0.162∗∗∗ −0.106∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗
(0.050) (0.062) (0.047) (0.060)
Above Median Overdose Rate × Party = Independent −0.025 −0.065
(0.089) (0.107)
Above Median Overdose Rate × Party = Republican 0.046 0.047
(0.069) (0.071)
Above Median Overdose Rate −0.010 −0.107∗∗ −0.077∗
(0.032) (0.044) (0.046)
Above Median Income × Party = Independent −0.262∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗
(0.087) (0.101)
Above Median Income × Party = Republican −0.208∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗
(0.068) (0.071)
Constant 0.684∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.100) (0.032) (0.099)
Demographic controls X X
Observations 990 842 1,010 902
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.126 0.024 0.045
F Statistic 21.135∗∗∗ 8.112∗∗∗ 5.861∗∗∗ 3.496∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Omitted category for partisanship is ’Democrat’
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Figure A2: Treatment funding policy support and 95%-confidence intervals by respondent
characteristics.
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E NIMBY Experiment in Tabular Form
In this section, we present the results for our clinic construction policy proposal. First,
we present our main treatment effect both with and without demographic controls in Ta-
ble A7. Across each specification the covariate-adjusted effect of self-interest differs only in
magnitude from the difference-in-means tests.
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Table A7: Spatial Self-Interest Effects
Support for:
Clinic Construction
(1) (2)
Distance Condition −0.142∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023)
Above State Median Income −0.041
(0.025)
Above Median Overdose Rate −0.013
(0.023)
Age 0.001
(0.001)
Female −0.053∗∗
(0.023)
Black 0.0002
(0.040)
Hispanic 0.023
(0.034)
Homeowner −0.094∗∗∗
(0.028)
Independent −0.081∗∗
(0.039)
Republican −0.133∗∗∗
(0.035)
Moderate −0.095∗∗∗
(0.031)
Conservative −0.163∗∗∗
(0.038)
College Degree 0.003
(0.024)
Married −0.034
(0.025)
Constant 0.526∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.050)
Observations 2,000 1,741
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.096
F Statistic 41.280∗∗∗ 14.176∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Omitted category for partisanship is ’Democrat’
and for ideology is ’Liberal’
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Additionally, in Table A8 we display the mean support among respondents in the near
treatment and among those in the far treatment for various subgroups of respondent charac-
teristics, along with the experimental treatment effect of spatial self-interest. In Figure A3
we show these subgroup treatment effects across ideology, income, personal contact with
someone struggling with addiction, local overdose rates, and race.
Finally, in Table A9 we more formally test for heterogeneity in our treatment effect of
spatial self-interest by interacting our treatment indicator with various demographic charac-
teristics. Across income, partisanship, and personal knowledge of someone with addiction,
we find no statistically distinguishable differences in the size of the effect of spatial self-
interest, for both the raw treatment effects and the covariate-adjusted effects. We do find
that the negative treatment effect of spatial self-interest is smaller for respondents who live
in areas with above-median overdose rates (p < 0.10). Specifically, as shown by the interac-
tion terms in columns (3) and (4), the magnitude of the effect of spatial self-interest among
respondents live in areas with higher overdose rates is approximately half the size of the
effect among people who live in areas with lower overdose rates. This interaction lacks a
clear theoretical explanation. As shown in Table A8 and Figure A5, respondents in high
overdose areas expressed both less support for clinics ‘far’ from them and more support for
clinics ‘near’ them. At the same time, the treatment effect of spatial self-interest is consistent
across groups personally exposed to someone struggling with addiction: the effects shown
in Figure A7 are similar across groups that did and did not report knowing someone with
opioid addiction issues. Future research should more fully explore this heterogenous effect.
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Figure A3: Clinic construction policy support and 95%-confidence intervals by respondent
characteristics.
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Table A8: Spatial Burden Subgroup Means and Treatment Effects
Subset Mean[Far] Mean[Near] Treatment effect (CI) p-value of difference
All Respondents 0.526 0.385 -0.142 0
(-0.185, -0.099)
n 1024 984
Above Median Income 0.492 0.35 -0.142 0
(-0.202, -0.082)
n 539 487
Below Median Income 0.565 0.419 -0.146 0
(-0.208, -0.084)
n 485 497
Above Median Overdose Rate 0.508 0.41 -0.098 0.003
(-0.162, -0.035)
n 484 452
Below Median Overdose Rate 0.543 0.363 -0.179 0
(-0.238, -0.121)
n 540 532
Democratic Respondents 0.634 0.486 -0.148 0
(-0.209, -0.086)
n 508 483
Republican Respondents 0.39 0.235 -0.155 0
(-0.224, -0.086)
n 356 320
Know Someone with Addiction 0.582 0.418 -0.164 0
(-0.223, -0.105)
n 543 533
Don’t Know Someone with Addiction 0.463 0.345 -0.119 0
(-0.182, -0.056)
n 481 451
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Table A9: Spatial Self-Interest Treatment Effect: Heterogeneity by Respondent Character-
istics
Dependent variable:
Clinic Construction Support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment Condition = Near −0.146∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Above Median Income −0.073∗∗ 0.00003
(0.031) (0.044)
Treatment Condition = Near × Above Median Income 0.005 0.021
(0.044) (0.046)
Above Median Overdose Rate −0.035 −0.052
(0.031) (0.032)
Treatment Condition = Near × Above Median Overdose Rate 0.081∗ 0.077∗
(0.044) (0.046)
Know Someone w/ Addiction 0.119∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032)
Treatment Condition = Near × Know Someone w/ Addiction −0.045 −0.022
(0.044) (0.045)
Party = Independent −0.150∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗
(0.044) (0.054)
Party = Republican −0.245∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.042)
Treatment Condition = Near × Party = Independent 0.040 0.070
(0.061) (0.072)
Treatment Condition = Near × Party = Republican −0.007 0.007
(0.048) (0.050)
Constant 0.565∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.071) (0.021) (0.069) (0.022) (0.070) (0.021) (0.068)
Demographic controls X X X X
Observations 2,000 1,741 2,000 1,741 2,000 1,741 1,997 1,741
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.097 0.020 0.099 0.029 0.105 0.068 0.098
F Statistic 17.287∗∗∗ 12.748∗∗∗ 14.904∗∗∗ 12.956∗∗∗ 20.675∗∗∗ 13.782∗∗∗ 30.188∗∗∗ 12.795∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Omitted category for partisanship is ’Democrat’. Controls include age, income, gender,
partisanship, ideology, college degree, marital status, race, and homeownership.
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Figure A4: Clinic construction policy support and 95%-confidence intervals by respondent
income compared to median income within respondent’s state.
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Figure A5: Clinic construction policy support and 95%-confidence intervals by respondent’s
county’s overdose rate compared to median overdose rate within respondent’s state.
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Figure A6: Clinic construction policy support and 95%-confidence intervals by respondent
partisanship.
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Figure A7: Clinic construction policy support and 95%-confidence intervals by respondent’s
personal exposure to someone who has been addicted to opioids.
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F Survey Questions
The survey used in this study contained two policy proposals and one follow-up question.
Each respondent answered both policy questions, and the order of the two policy questions
was randomized. For the first proposed policy, respondents viewed one of two split-sample
options describing the funding model of the proposed state policy to treat opioid addiction:
either a needs-based or an income-based funding model. Each respondent’s state was piped
into the question wording using their state of residence as previously reported in the NORC
AmeriSpeak intake survey. Information on the respondent’s area’s rate of opioid use was
similarly piped in using their ZIP code. Information on whether the respondent was above or
below their state’s median income was also piped in using their pre-reported income. For the
second policy proposal, respondents viewed one of two options that differently described the
location of a proposed opioid addiction treatment clinic. Finally, all respondents answered
the question on personal exposure to the opioid crisis.
Proposal 1, evenly randomized between Needs-Based Treatment and Income-Based Option
1. The [STATE] government is considering a policy to fund medication-assisted treatment
programs for people with substance abuse problems across the state. The cost would be
$100 million total. These programs would help people affected by the opioid crisis. It would
do this by providing needed medication and follow-up that can keep them off dangerous opi-
oids and prevent deadly overdoses. Taxpayers in [STATE] will bear the costs of this policy,
divided up in the following way.
[Local Overdose Rate-Based Option]
• Taxpayers in areas with above average rates of opioid use will pay an additional $55 in
taxes. In contrast, taxpayers in areas with below average rates of opioid use will pay
an additional $5 in taxes.12
• Based on your ZIP code, you live in an area with [an above/a below] average rate of
opioid use.
[Income-Based Option]
• Taxpayers with an above average income will pay an additional $55 in taxes. In
contrast, taxpayers with a below average income will pay an additional $5 in taxes.
• Based on your income, you have [an above/a below] average level of income.
Would you support or oppose this policy?
1. Strongly support
2. Somewhat support
3. Neither support nor oppose
4. Somewhat oppose
5. Strongly oppose
12Although the assignment is based on above/below the state’s median level, we use the term ‘average’ for
cognitive ease.
A-17
Experiment, evenly randomized between Near Treatment and Far Treatment
2. Medication-assisted treatment clinics provide help for people with substance abuse prob-
lems. They do this by providing needed medication (such as methadone) and follow-up that
can keep them off dangerous opioids and prevent deadly overdoses.
[Near Treatment]
Would you support the opening of a new medication-assisted treatment clinic for opioid ad-
diction a 1/4 mile (5 minute walk) from your home?
[Far Treatment] Would you support the opening of a new medication-assisted treatment
clinic for opioid addiction 2 miles (40 minute walk) from your home?
1. Strongly support
2. Somewhat support
3. Neither support nor oppose
4. Somewhat oppose
5. Strongly oppose
Personal Exposure, descriptive/non-experimental question 3. Do you personally know anyone
who has ever been addicted to opioids, including prescription painkillers or heroin?
1. Yes, me
2. Yes, a family member
3. Yes, a close friend
4. Yes, an acquaintance
5. No, I do not know anyone who has ever been addicted to opioids
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